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Abstract
Recent work in cognitive science has uncovered a diversity of explanatory values, or dimen-
sions along which we judge explanations as better or worse. We propose a Bayesian account
of how these values fit together to guide explanation. The resulting taxonomy provides
a set of predictors for which explanations people prefer and shows how core values from
psychology, statistics, and the philosophy of science emerge from a common mathemat-
ical framework. In addition to operationalizing the explanatory virtues associated with,
for example, scientific argument-making, this framework also enables us to reinterpret the
explanatory vices that drive conspiracy theories, delusions, and extremist ideologies.
I Explaining explanation
Intuitively, philosophically, and as seen in laboratory experiments, explanations are judged as
better or worse on the basis of many different criteria. These explanatory values appear in
early childhood [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and their influence extends to some of the most sophisticated social
knowledge formation processes we know [6]. We lack, however, an understanding of the origin of
these values or an account of how they fit together to guide belief formation. The multiplicity of
values also appears to conflict with Bayesian models of cognition, which speak solely in terms of
degrees of beliefs and suggest we judge explanations as better or worse on the basis of a single
quantity, the posterior likelihood (see Glossary). In this opinion, we show how to resolve these
conflicts by arguing that previously-identified explanatory values capture different components of
a full Bayesian calculation and, when considered together and weighed appropriately, implement
Bayesian cognition.
This framework shows how key explanatory values identified by laboratory experiments and
philosophers of science—co-explanation, descriptiveness, precision, unification, power,
and simplicity—emerge naturally from the mathematical structure of probabilistic inference,
thereby reconciling them with Bayesian models of cognition [7, 8]. Second, it shows how these
values combine to produce preferences for one explanation over another. Third, it emphasizes
new conceptual distinctions, such as one between explanatory values that can be assessed before
the arrival of data (theoretical values) and those that can only be assessed after the arrival
of data (empirical values). Finally, it enables us to reinterpret work on the characteristic
deviations from normative patterns of explanation that drive phenomena such as conspiracy
theories, delusions, and extremist ideologies.
It also resolves a tension in the influential philosophical account of “inference to the best
explanation” (IBE; [1, 6, 9]) which says belief formation is, or should be, guided by explanatory
considerations. While some hold that IBE is incompatible with Bayesian updating because
explanatory considerations cannot be captured within a probabilistic framework [10, 11], others
argue that the two are either compatible [12, 13, 14, 15] or potentially even identical [16, 17].
We adopt this latter perspective, and show how our framework provides a compelling—albeit
preliminary—account of how such an “emergent compatabilism” [16] can be achieved. 1
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1A more nuanced difference between Bayesianism and many variants of IBE is that the former, on its own,
provides a system for determining the relative strength of various theories while the latter actually provides
grounds for accepting a single, “best” explanation [18]. Clearly, however, one can combine Bayesian updating
with any number of rules for acceptance, such as choosing the explanation that has the maximum a posteriori
probability (MAP) of being correct.
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Highlights
• Recent experiments show that we value explanations for many reasons, such as
predictive power and simplicity.
• Bayesian rational analysis provides a functional account of these values, along with
concrete definitions that allow us to measure and compare them across a variety of
contexts including visual perception, politics, and science.
• These values include descriptiveness, co-explanation, unification, power, and sim-
plicity, and fall into two groups: the first two are associated with the evaluation of
explanations in the light of experience, while the latter concern the intrinsic features
of an explanation.
• Failures to explain well can be understood as imbalances in these values: a conspir-
acy theorist, for example, may over-rate co-explanation relative to simplicity, and
many similar “failures to explain” that we see in social life may be analyzable at
this level.
Box 1: Bayes’ Rule Decomposes into Explanatory Values
Formally, an explanation E is evaluated on the basis of its log-likelihood in the presence
of evidence x = {x1, . . . , xn}; using Bayes rule, this gives us
log p(E|x) =
n∑
i=1
log p(xi|E)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Descriptiveness
+ log
(
p(x|E)∏n
i=1 p(xi|E)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Co-explanation
+
∑
i
log Ti(E)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Theoretical Values
+ log pi(E)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contextual Factors
The terms in this decomposition are: (i) descriptiveness, which measures the total extent
to which the explanation predicts each fact in isolation from the others; (ii) co-explanation,
which measures the extent to which the explanation links facts together; (iii) theoretical,
or evidence-independent values; and (iv) context-dependent priors. (For simplicity, we do
not show the additional normalization term that is constant across all explanations and
thus does not affect comparisons between explanations.)
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II A Bayesian Framework for Explanatory Values
Bayes’ rule says that we should value an explanation in terms of a “posterior” degree of belief,
determined by our prior degree of belief in that explanation times the probability that it assigns
to the data we have observed. Working with log-probabilities means that the components of
this calculation combine additively, matching the intuition that we weigh multiple features of an
explanation by adding them together to make final determinations about its validity.
Box 1 shows how the log-posterior can be rearranged into a series of additive terms which
define, mathematically, values identified across a variety of different contexts. The first two
terms are empirical, and track how an explanation accounts for observed data: descriptiveness
(formally, the log-likelihood under the assumption that the data are independent), measures how
well an explanation predicts the facts in isolation, and co-explanation (formally, the information-
theoretic pointwise multi-information), measures how well an explanation predicts patterns that
connect facts together. The next terms are theoretical and track the value of an explanation
independently from the data. As we will argue, two key theoretical values correspond to expected
empirical values, while others reflect structural features of an explanation and context-depenent
priors.
This leads to two pairs of explanatory values—descriptiveness and power, co-explanation and
unification—that appear either at the empirical or the theoretical stage, respectively, along with
an additional theoretical value of simplicity. The correspondences between the mathematical
terms and the explanatory values are shown in the Glossary. We discuss each in turn.
III Explanation through the Lens of Descriptiveness and
Power
The simplest way to judge an explanation is to consider each piece of evidence for it independently,
keeping a running tally of the degree to which it makes the explanation look better or worse.
This is captured by descriptiveness, the sum of the independent log-probabilites of the relevant
facts.2
Although descriptiveness neglects that facts are rarely independent, it nevertheless often
works quite well. For example, when evaluating students on the basis of their grades, we can
usually interpret each mark as an independent reflection of academic ability, thus making GPA
a useful summary. On the other hand, overemphasis on descriptiveness in a domain where
correlations really do matter results in a cognitive bias known as correlation neglect [20].
The theoretical value corresponding to descriptiveness is power: how descriptive an expla-
nation is in a world where it was true. Valuing power means valuing explanations that make
more definite predictions. All other things being equal, more descriptiveness is always a good
thing. Power is more ambiguous, and someone might consider power to be a virtue or a vice.
High-power explanations make definitive predictions and therefore more easily falsified; they are
also more easily learned from experience. Further, if you believe a high power explanation, you
expect those who value descriptiveness to be receptive to it as well.
Power can also be a vice, however, because the world is not always as predictable as we might
wish. In uncertain situations, one might value low power explanations as more open-minded
and allowing for a wider range of possibilities. Indeed, in statistics, Ref. [21] has advocated for
the “principle of maximum entropy”, which views minimizing precision—the sum of power and
unification (discussed below)—as a universal normative rule of inference because it presumes to
know the least a priori.
2A similar approximation is frequently employed in statistics—the familiar identically and independently
distributed (IID) assumption.
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Glossary
Explanation: an account of some observable aspect of the world. In the Bayesian
framework, an explanation supplies a probability distribution over events.
Explanatory Values: explanatory features that lead us to prefer one explanation over
another.
Empirical Values:
(Ways in which an explanation can be valued on the basis of data.)
Log-Likelihood: log p(x|E)
The log-probability of observed data given an explanation.
Descriptiveness:
∑
i log p(xi|E)
The total log-probability of observed data given an explanation when each observation is
considered in isolation.
Co-explanation: log
(
p(x|E)∏n
i=1 p(xi|E)
)
The relative increase in log-probability that an explanation gives a pattern of observed
data above its ability to predict each piece in isolation. Equal to point-wise mutual
information in the case of two variables, or point-wise multi-information in the general
case [19].
Theoretical Values:
(“Priors”, or ways in which an explanation can be valued without reference to data.)
Precision: EE [log p(x|E)]
The expected likelihood of data conditional on the explanation being true. Also equal to
the negative entropy of the explanation. Measures the degree to which an explanation’s
predictions concentrate in a particular subset of the space of all possible outcomes.
Power: EE [
∑
i log p(xi|E)]
The expected descriptiveness of data conditional on the explanation being true. Measures
the degree to which an explanation tends to produce individual pieces of data that it can
account for in isolation.
Unification: EE
[
log
(
p(x|E)∏n
i=1 p(xi|E)
)]
The expected co-explanation of data conditional on the explanation being true. Also
equal to the mutual information in the case of two variables, or the multi-information
in the general case. Measures the degree to which an explanation predicts patterns of
outcomes and connects multiple variables together.
Simplicity: any function that measures how straightforward an explanation is. Exam-
ples include parsimony, concision, and elegance. The appropriate choice of will generally
depend on context.
Parsimony: a type of simplicity that reflects the number of elements, parameters, or
principles an explanation requires.
Concision: a type of simplicity that measures how compact an explanation is, e.g., by
counting the number of words required to communicate it.
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Box 2: Explanatory Values in Action
A common paradigm to tease apart explanatory values is disease diagnosis [22, 23, 24].
Participants are asked to explain a patient’s symptoms by reference to different medical
conditions. The figure above illustrates a general case of this task, where there are
three potential explanations (shaded in red, blue, and yellow, with density of each color
indicating probability) that might produce different patterns of symptoms (here, different
combinations of a patient’s blood oxygenation and temperature).
In the framework of Bayesian explanatory values proposed here, the blue explanation
has low power (it allows for a wide range of outcomes) and low unification (patient
temperature is not particularly well predicted by oxygenation). The red explanation
has higher power (a narrower range of possibilities), and non-zero co-explanation (high
patient temperatures are usually accompanied by low blood oxygenation). The yellow
explanation is similar to the red in that it is both powerful and co-explanatory, but
implies a less simple relationships between oxygenation and temperature.
Confronted with three different patients (A, B, and C), these explanations also have
different empirical values. For example, the red explanation has lower descriptiveness
than the yellow explanation (patients A and C fall somewhat outside the normal range
for red), but higher co-explanation than the blue (the temperatures of all three patients
predict their oxygenation). For the particular case of patient A, red also has higher
co-explanation than yellow, since a patient with A’s temperature under the yellow
explanation can have a wider oxygenation range.
Which explanation is best depends on context. Even if the yellow explanation is more
valued on the basis of descriptiveness and co-explanation, power or unification, a person
may still come to prefer the red—or even the blue—with a strong enough preference for
simplicity. For example, the yellow explanation may produce its complex relationship
between oxygenation and temperature by invoking the presence of two diseases simulta-
neously, or through a complicated interaction of different underlying conditions.
Explanations are evaluated relative to a (usually stable) background ontology: here, oxy-
genation and temperature. If the ontology changes, so do the values and if, for example,
doctors worked with a quantity equal to “temperature minus oxygenation”, then the
red explanation would become less co-explanatory and more descriptive, while their sum
remains constant. 5
IV Explanation through the Lens of Co-explanation and
Unification
In addition to considering facts in isolation, we also care about how they connect together. This
is captured by “co-explanation”, which measures how well an explanation predicts a pattern
of observations over and above how well it accounts for each independently. While this defi-
nition arises naturally from our Bayesian decomposition, its mathematical form matches that
proposed by Ref. [25] as an operationalization of IBE and by Ref. [26] as an operationalization
of explanatory considerations in Ref. [27].
Co-explanation is high when an explanation says some features of the data are predicted by
others. For example, when economists observed that unemployment and inflation were inversely
correlated, they proposed that the relationship was a general law—the Phillips curve [28]. Expla-
nations that included this law had, as a consequence, co-explanatory value: inflation appeared
to become predictable given knowledge of unemployment. Beyond economics, this value is par-
ticularly relevant in domains characterized by correlating common causes, such as diseases in
medical diagnosis [29], legal cases [30], and social interactions [31]; see Box 2.
Psychological studies in these domains are often implicit tests of an individual’s sensitivity
to co-explanation as an explanatory value. Ref. [22] trained participants on cases that noted the
presence or absence of various symptoms for patients with a fictitious disease. When asked to
judge which of two new patients was more likely to have the disease, subjects were sensitive to not
only whether each of their symptoms was a likely result (descriptiveness), but also whether their
presentation preserved correlations between symptoms seen in the training set (co-explanation).3
That the mind links distinct experiences into coherent wholes is also at the heart of Gestalt
psychology: “to apply the gestalt category means to find out which parts of nature belong as
parts to functional wholes, to discover their position in these wholes, their degree of relative in-
dependence, and the articulation of larger wholes into sub-wholes” [32]. In vision, for example, it
is argued that we perceive not the individual pieces of raw sense-data, but rather the explanation
that links them together; the Kanizsa Triangle is compelling because the implicit shape we see
co-explains the orientations of the missing wedges.
Co-explanation has the parallel theoretical value of unification, the expected co-explanation
of the explanation conditional upon its truth. Unification says that the world is characterized not
by coincidences, but patterns. It is a commonly value in the philosophy of science; for Ref. [33], a
good scientific theory makes the manifestation of different phenomena dependent on each other,
and a similar account can be found in Ref. [34], for whom good theories form a “systemtic”
picture of the order of nature.
As with power, unification may be both virtue and vice. Even when a unifying theory is
complicated, it does assert that the world itself is simple, because knowledge of some of its
features allow you to predict others. Unifying theories, like powerful ones, are also more testable:
one can look not only for unexpected events, but also patterns.4 On the other hand, experiments
show that unification may be perceived as a vice. Consider, for example, two explanations for
“why Lois painted her nails in the shower” [35]: (a) ‘she is afraid of spilling nail polish on her
antique bathroom rug” or (b) “she is obsessive–compulsive”,‘. Explanation (b) correlates Lois’
behavior with a many other (as yet) unobserved behaviors, and so is higher in unification (in that
paper’s terminology, has broader latent scope) than Explanation (a). However, subjects tended
to prefer theories with lower unification (narrower latent scope).
3Crucially, co-explanation requires variation along different dimensions: if it is impossible, for example, for
the data vary along a particular axes under a certain explanation, than knowledge of that aspect of the world
tells us nothing new about the others because there is nothing left to explain. In this special case, the theory may
have many virtues, such as high descriptiveness or power, but its co-explanation is at a minimum.
4More formally, the number of tests of a high power theory is linear in the number of features one looks at, but
the number of tests of a unifying theory scale quadratically if one looks for pairwise correlations, or exponentially,
when considering all combinations.
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V Explanation through the Lens of Simplicity and Other
Priors
Explanation and descriptiveness help us weigh explanations in a Bayesian fashion. Without
simplicity, however, they are rarely good enough; as pointed out by thinkers such as Galileo,
Newton, and Kant [36], one can often “improve” an explanation by adding more parameters,
exceptions, and mechanisms, an observation linked to Occam’s Razor. In Bayesian inference,
simplicity enters into the prior. Accordingly, our intuitive notion of simplicity is captured by one
or more theoretical values [37].
Ref. [23] finds evidence for this using an alien disease paradigm that puts descriptiveness and
simplicity (here, parsimony) into conflict: participants’ explanatory preferences are consistent
with a value for descriptiveness plus a constant, i.e. data-independent, penalty for theory elab-
orateness (lack of parsimony). Further research has shown that such preferences take form early
in childhood development and are robust across contexts [1, 2, 5].
Simplicity is complex, and our intuitive notion is an amalgam of many theoretical considera-
tions. Table 3 illustrates the independent operation of two such considerations when explanations
have a causal form. The upper-left theory is both more parsimonious (fewer hidden causes) and
also more unified (providing a joint account of events) than the bottom-right theory. However,
these effects can be decomposed. We therefore also have parsimonious-disjointed theories (where
each visible aspect has a streamlined, but non-overlapping latent causal structure) and elaborate-
unified theories (where everything is connected by a sprawling web of relations). This latter kind
is reminiscent of conspiracy theories, where in one sense everything is very simple (all visible
aspects are connected to each other), but that simplicity is achieved by postulating an elaborate
web of hidden connections.
In statistics, simplicity is part of model selection, and there are many forms [21, 38]: the
commonly-used Akaike Information Criterion [39] and Bayesian Information Criterion [40] are
parsimony measures that count the number of parameters in a theory. In machine learning,
regularization terms penalize non-zero parameter values to prevent overfitting to data. Mean-
while, the maximum entropy principle [41] understands simplicity as (negative) precision. There
is general consensus both (1) simplicity is crucial to normative decision making, and (2) however
the value is measured, it ought to enter additively in log-space, i.e., as term in the prior shown
in our Box 1 [42].
While statistical models are often concerned with prediction, the psychological value of sim-
plicity goes well beyond this goal. Simple explanations can be easier to remember and work
with, and may be preferred because we are limited beings with cognitive constraints. A simple
explanation may be better because it requires fewer cognitive resources to apply or leads to fewer
mistakes. Simple explanations are also easier to communicate and teach, and thus ease social
coordination. Ssimplicity may even be seen as an aesthetic value, with simple explanations de-
scribed as “elegant” and, on that basis, valuable in and of themselves; “mathematical beauty”
plays a significant [43, 44], if controversial [45], role in physics.
Simplicity is not the only domain-general theoretical value, as there are many prior reasons to
prefer one theory over another. Entire classes of explanations may be categorically better than
others; for example, those that reveal causal mechanisms [46, 47, 48], explain new phenomena
by analogy to familiar ones [49], or feature concrete mechanisms rather than abstract principles
[29]. Within each class, humans have been shown to hold strong, contextually-informed priors for
certain kinds of explanations. For example, we prefer explanations that involve diseases causing
symptoms over the reverse [50] and find some causal connections immediately implausible [51].
These priors reflect our ability to flexibly apply background knowledge to new problems [52] and
often take the form of intuitions and instincts—what Galileo referred to as “il lume naurale” or
“the natural light” that guides our reason (1.80 of Ref. [53]).
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Unified Disjointed
Parsimonious
x1 x2
z1
x1 x2
z1 z2
Elaborate
x1 x2
z1 z2 z3
x1 x2
z1 z2 z3
Table 1: In these diagrams that represent the causal structure of different explanations, shaded
nodes represent observables, other nodes represented postulated latent causes, and arrows repre-
sent causal relationships. Simplicity is a rich concept that likely binds together multiple intuitions
simultaneously. One way of assessing simplicity is parsimony, which counts the number of pa-
rameters or latent causes invoked by an explanation. A second way of assessing simplicity is
unification, which measures the degree to which a theory provides an overarching, connected
account of multiple features of the world. Explanations can vary along each of these dimensions
independently, so that their overall “simplicity” might be judged as an additive composite of the
two.
VI When Values become Vices
Our approach yields a normative prescription where deviations from equal weighting lead to
characteristic explanatory pathologies which canoperationalize what Ref. [54] calls “vice episte-
mology”.
Consider the phenomenon of overgeneralization [55], i.e., attempting to cover all examples
with a single explanation rather than allowing for exceptions. This can be caused by over-valuing
co-explanation relative to descriptiveness, or by over-valuing unification (since theories that have
high unification will tend to have higher co-explanation when they are good fits to the data).
What makes a weighting virtuous varies across contexts. For example, the appropriate amount
of simplicity depends upon the domain [13], and there is evidence that people complexity-
match [56], i.e., allow the perceived complexity of the explanandum to guide priors on the
simplicity of the explanation. With that being said, recent empirical work has started to tie
abnormal reasoning to common inferential biased that generalize across domains in a way that
suggests the systemic miscalibration of values may be at fault.
For example, as noted by Ref. [57], those prone to paranormal thinking also show susceptibility
to the conjunction fallacy. This can result from overvaluing co-explanation, because labeling
Linda a feminist as well as a bank teller [58] provides a co-explanatory account of her political
and social activities. Empirical work has also established strong individual differences in the
tendency to believe conspiracies: those who believe one are more likely to believe others [59].
This trait is common in individuals with schizotypal disorders [60], which are linked in turn to
a number of other explanatory abnormalities [61]. The finding that conspiracy-mindedness is a
stable trait suggests that the its associated beliefs may be accumulated over time due, at least
in part, to a systematic miscalibration in an individual’s weighting of explanatory values.
Conspiracy theories are often both abnormally co-explanatory and descriptive [62]. They ac-
count for anomalous facts which are unlikely under the “official” explanation (“errant data” [63];
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see, e.g., Ref. [64] on Oaklahoma City bombing conspiracy theories), and show how seemingly
arbitrary facts of ordinary life are correlated by hidden events [65]; Ref. [66] finds that a manip-
ulation which induces subjects to see (illusory) correlations in neutral domains like stock returns
also increases beliefs in conspiracy theories. Finally, and famously, conspiracy theories are uni-
fying: they describe a universe where everything is correlated by a network of hidden common
causes—the motives and meetings of the conspirators [67].
Valuing these features is not, in and of itself, a vice. What frequently goes wrong is the
failure to balance these values against others, such as simplicity or contextual priors that urge
trust in institutions and down-weight generalizations associated with racist, sexist, or antisemitic
prejudice. On the surface, a conspiracy theory is quite simple; as it is unfolded, however, in-
creasing complexity is required to explain contradictory evidence and the cover-up that has, so
far, prevented it from coming to light. Such a judgement is itself open to criticism; as noted by
[68], some conspiracies are extremely compelling on normative grounds. Some even turn out to
be true.
This latter point gets to the heart of what makes explanation so difficult. Striking a virtuous
balance between so many considerations is itself a challenging cognitive problem, one that we solve
partially by social circumspection. Failures at this level might help to explain anti-vaccination
movements [69], COVID-19 conspiracies [70], the use of pseudoscience in extremist ideologies
[71], and science denialism [72]. While these beliefs are in part formed and maintained by
social processes in addition to epistemic ones, their core logic often appeals to many of the
same explanatory imbalances as conspiracy theories do. These interact with individual-level
predispositions, including what are usually taken to be pathologies of thought. One avenue for
future research is how social processes may serve to maintain, accentuate, or exploit individual-
level explanatory imbalances.5
VII Concluding remarks
Framing explanatory values as components of a Bayesian inference is a form of rational analysis,
which seeks to understand mental states in terms of the computational goals they help agents
achieve [82, 83]. Such an approach has been applied to a wide range of subjective states such
as representativeness [84], suspicious coincidence [85], randomness [86], tip of the tongue [87],
boredom and flow [88], mental effort [89], and curiosity [90, 91, 92]. Of these, explanation is most
closely related to curiosity. If curiosity drives us to seek answers to salient questions [93] and to
make sense of the world around us [94], then explanatory values are the subjective states that
signal, often in compelling hedonic form [95], when good answers have been found.
A Bayesian framing naturally centers on an explanation’s ability to predict observed data.
Explanation is more than prediction, however, and other features are necessary to satisfy the
many social, cognitive, and practical constraints that bear on the practice. A highly-predictive
black box, for example, is not something that we can evaluate in terms of theoretical constructions
such as parsimony or unification. Even when the black box is opened, what is inside may be so
far from “virtuous” in the human sense that it scarcely counts as an explanation at all—even if
it is intelligible in a literal sense. There is something more basic yet, of course: an explanation
must be intelligible before we can ask about its value. This is part of the “explainability crisis”
in machine learning [96] and is crucial to understanding, and thereby closing, the gap between
human and artificial intelligence [97, 98]. While a rational analysis of explanatory values is an
important first step, further work is needed to address the intelligibility problem.
All explanation occurs against a background of folk theories, world-views, and explanations
that have come before [34]. This opinion suggests that it may be possible to enumerate “atomic”
explanatory values, and that the history of explanation is largely the history of their relative em-
phasis. Given that explanations emerge in a social context, however, we might also expect new
values—especially theoretical ones—to appear over time. This dynamical, contextual natural of
5Vices of overvaluation naturally co-exist with other biases, such as, for example, omission bias in the case of
anti-vaccine movements [69].
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Box 3: Three Stages of Explanation
1. Generation 2. Selection 3. Evaluation
Observations: fixed fixed variable
Explanations: variable fixed fixed
Explanation decomposes into three stages: we generate explanations (or receive them
from others), select among them, and re-evaluate them based on subsequent experience.
Our piece has focused on how values influence selection, but they are equally important
in generation and re-evaluation.
Values help us decide which experiences to seek out next. Co-explanation may lead me
to look in places where I expect the data to be correlated under a favored hypothesis.
Descriptiveness, conversely, may lead one to look for key counter-examples, in the style
of Karl Popper’s falsification [73].
Values also act at the generation stage. Ref. [74] describes scientific hypothesis formation
as descriptiveness-driven, where explanations are updated in response to outliers: one
produces an explanation, looks for places that it fails, and tries to update it in response.
Co-explanation in the generation phase can also look like Peircean abudction [75]. The
cycle, augmented to include the gathering of data, is used by both children [5] and adults
[76].
A descriptiveness-driven cycle need not be virtuous: updating an explanation may in-
crease its descriptiveness at the cost of theoretical values such as unification or simplicity.
Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” is driven in part by the decreasing simplicity of the standard
paradigm: as anomalies arrive, more and more epicycles are required to explain them [77].
Rather than looking for outliers because we value descriptiveness, one may look for
correlations because we value co-explanation. A person who subscribes to a “unifying”
group stereotype, for example, may ask if people belong to the group in question
when they show its characteristic behaviors. More virtuously, co-explanation can drive
scientists to compare evidence across different domains.
Empirical values also direct attention at a more basic, cognitive level. Ref [78] find that
descriptiveness draws the eye to outliers: attention to a group of pixels correlates with
deviations from its predicted distribution. Co-explanation, conversely, draws attention
to patterns that constitute gestalts [79].
Theoretical values, conversely, are crucial to how we go about generation, because we
cannot consider every explanation. Parsimony and contextual considerations help us
reject certain types of explanations out of hand [80], while unification makes the world
itself easier to remember and describe. Theoretical values can sometimes be a vice, and
we often fail to generate good explanations even when we have the ability to recognize
them [81].
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explanation are clarifies why explanations seem more valuable when they co-explain phenomena
that, on the basis of previous understanding, were conceptually distant (see Box 3). Indeed,
conceptual distance and co-explanation may be two sides of the same coin: what is conceptu-
ally distant may just be what, with our current explanations, we can not co-explain. Another
important aspect of the dynamical side of explanation is the role of prediction out of sample,
i.e., re-evaluation when new information arrives. Because predicting the future is much more
challenging than accounting for what is already known, doing so can be a powerful source of
(empirical) value.
The importance of conceptual distance and the power of confirmation by unexpected data
come together in “consilience”. Consilience is an explanatory value introduced by [99] in the
19th Century to describe features of scientific explanations that, he argues, both are, and ought
to be, prized by the community. “The Consilience of Inductions”, Whewell writes, “takes place
when an induction, obtained from one class of facts, coincides with an induction, obtained from
another class... Such a coincidence of untried facts with speculative assertions cannot be the
work of chance, but implies some portion of truth in the principles on which the reasoning is
founded.” Indeed, for Whewell, consilience carries simplicity and unification along for the ride:
for consilient explanations, “all the additional suppositions tend to simplicity and harmony...
the system becomes more coherent as it is further extended. The elements which we require for
explaining a new class of facts are already contained in our system. Different members of the
theory run together, and we have thus a constant convergence to unity.”
Whewell is far from the only writer to draw attention to the general features of what makes
for good explanation, and a significant part of social interaction involves debating and arguing
for different explanations on the basis of the values they exhibit [100]. The implicit bargain for
this paper is that such values may be amenable to an analysis in terms of basic, atomic units
active in similar ways across a great variety of domains. Once identified, these units can provide
a new way to understand how people make sense of the world.
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Outstanding Questions
• How are the atomic elements of explanatory values perceived and combined by
the mind? Why these elements, and not others? Where do they come from in
evolutionary and cultural time?
• To what extent are values determined during early childhood development, versus
learned in later life? Can people change their values in response to experience or
teaching?
• How do explanatory values influence the cultural evolution of explanations?
• What determines the categories (i.e. variables) over which explanatory values are
evaluated? How do these co-evolve with explanations? Are these categories deter-
mined by other forces, or are they—at least partially—determined by explanatory
considerations themselves?
• How universal are these values? How much of the difference between individual
preferences for explanations is driven by domain-general explanatory values versus
contextual priors?
• What is the connection between organic brain diseases and imbalanced explanatory
values? What can this tell us about how the neurological basis of these values and
the manner in which they are assessed?
• To what extent are social movements associated with pathological beliefs (such as
extremist ideologies) driven by explanatory imbalance? Does participation in such
a movement reinforce such imbalances?
• To what extent are values simply a means of achieving the practical goal of predic-
tion? What other roles do they play in human life?
• What is the relationship between moral and practical explanation?
• What makes an explanation intelligible “to us”?
• How can we enable machines to explain as well as predict? Can explanatory values
help the task of bridging the gap between human and artificial intelligence?
12
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